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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate whether there is evidence of a target company cross-border 
effect by comparing the premium for those companies acquired by other UK companies 
with the premium for those companies acquired by non-UK firms.  Using data for the period 
1986-1991, it is found that target company shareholders gain significantly more from cross-
border than from domestic acquisitions.  The cross-border effect appears to be partly 
attributable to a significantly higher proportion of cross-border than domestic bids being full 
cash offer, and target company shareholders are found to gain significantly more from cash 
than from equity offers.  However, even after controlling for these and other bid 
characteristics, the target company cross-border effect remains highly significant, 
amounting to somewhere between 6.02 and 9.17 percentage points, depending on model 
specification. 
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CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS INTO THE UK 
- AN ANALYSIS OF TARGET COMPANY RETURNS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the late 1980s, the UK witnessed a major takeover boom, fuelled to a large 
extent by cross-border acquisitions into the UK.  In this paper, the extent to which 
shareholders of UK target companies gain from these cross-border acquisitions is analyzed 
and compared to the gains associated with domestic UK acquisitions.  If capital markets 
and the market for corporate control are not segmented internationally, one would not 
expect the level of abnormal returns to target company shareholders to be systematically 
different in domestic and cross-border acquisitions (Fatemi and Furtado (1988), Franks and 
Harris (1991)).  However, Kang (1993) argues that 
"since the theory of FDI posits that imperfections ... give multinational firms a 
competitive advantage over local firms in the host country, cross-border acquisitions 
are likely to create more wealth than domestic acquisitions.  Since targets tend to 
reap more of the benefits of the acquisitions, the theory suggests the wealth gains to 
targets of ... [foreign] firms are larger than those to targets ... [in domestic 
acquisitions]". (p. 348). 
Despite the significant scale of cross-border acquisitions throughout the world, the 
empirical evidence with regard to cross-border acquisitions is still rather limited and heavily 
skewed towards the US market.   While a number of studies (as discussed in the literature 
review below) have tested the differential wealth effects of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions for target company shareholders in the US, no similar analysis of the target 
company cross-border effect has been undertaken for the UK.  In this paper we address 
this important gap in the finance literature.   We empirically investigate the validity of Kang’s 
(1993) theoretical assertion for the UK by providing a comparative analysis of the gains to 
shareholders of UK companies targeted in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  
Consistent with Kang’s proposition – and the majority of the prior evidence for the US – we 
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find target company shareholders in the UK to gain significantly more in cross-border than 
in domestic acquisitions.  While this appears to be partly attributable to a payment effect, 
the target company cross-border effect remains highly significant, at somewhere between 
6.02 and 9.17 percentage points (depending on model specification), once payment and 
other bid characteristics are controlled for.  We also test various hypotheses as to why 
there might be a cross-border effect in the UK.  We do not find support for either the EU 
market access hypothesis or an exchange rate effect.  As there are several competing 
hypotheses for why a target company cross-border effect may exist and our empirical 
analysis is unable to distinguish between them, its precise cause remains a puzzle. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The factors identified in the literature as to why 
target company shareholders may expect to gain more in cross-border than in domestic 
acquisitions are discussed in section II.  This is followed by a brief discussion in section III 
of prior empirical evidence on the target company cross-border effect.  The data and 
methodology are explained in section IV.  This section includes a discussion of several 
alternative hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework that may account for 
differential bid premia.  These factors are controlled for and tested in the cross-sectional 
analysis, the results of which are presented in section V.  Conclusions are provided in 
section VI. 
 
II. TARGET COMPANY CROSS-BORDER EFFECTS - THEORETICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Factors suggested in the literature to explain why target shareholders may gain 
more in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions fall into four main categories: 
international risk diversification; market access; exchange rate effects; and managerial 
factors1. 
 
1. Domestic and cross-border acquisitions may produce different levels of abnormal 
returns if markets for corporate control are segmented across national boundaries 
(Fatemi and Furtado (1988)).  The level of abnormal returns may also vary with the 
rules and regulations governing mergers and acquisitions or the efficiency of the 
market for corporate control (Conn and Connell (1990)).  However, although these 
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i) International Risk Diversification 
There is general agreement that shareholders benefit from international portfolio 
diversification (e.g., Solnik (1974) and Davis (1991)), but that in efficient security markets 
such benefits should not extend to corporate diversification (Sudia (1992), Markides and 
Ittner (1994), Hymer (1976), Jacquillat and Solnik (1978), Fatemi (1984), and Michel and 
Shaked (1986)).  However, Hymer (1976), Hisey and Caves (1985) and Markides and Ittner 
(1994) argue that, under certain market inefficiencies, investors could benefit from 
international corporate diversification through cross-border acquisitions.  For example, 
information asymmetries may mean that a company is better informed than its investors 
and thus able to make better investment decisions than its shareholders.  Markides and 
Ittner add that "...the multinational corporation is performing a valuable service to investors 
in that it allows them to diversify their portfolios indirectly". (p. 346).  Thus, it can be 
hypothesized that corporate international diversification has the potential of being beneficial 
to shareholders.  If international diversification is an additional source of value to overseas 
bidders (and they are prepared to or forced by target company shareholders to pass on 
 
factors may result in different levels of abnormal returns to target company 
shareholders in different countries, and to different levels of acquiror returns in 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions, the segmented or inefficient takeover 
markets hypotheses are unlikely to account for differential target company wealth 
effects in domestic and cross-border acquisitions within a country. 
A further consideration relates to the scope for cost savings post acquisition.  
Jaquemin et al. (1989) find cross-border acquisitions within the EU to reveal little 
evidence to suggest that these transactions result in greater efficiencies or that 
economies of scale or monopoly powers are exploited.  Indeed, economies of scale 
may be easier to achieve in domestic than in cross-border acquisitions.  If acquiring 
companies share cost savings with target company shareholders, this would 
suggest that target company shareholders may gain more in domestic than in cross-
border acquisitions.  The effect of differential cost savings following domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions is not analysed in this study. 
There is also a possibility that bidding companies based in some countries 
will be subject to more favorable tax treatment or accounting regulation than 
companies based in other countries.  This may affect their ability or willingness to 
pay high takeover premia (Choi and Lee (1991)). Seventeen overseas countries are 
represented in the cross-border acquisitions into the UK covered in this study.  An 
analysis of the different accounting regulations or tax treatments in these countries 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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part of that benefit to them), one would expect target company shareholders to gain more in 
cross-border than in domestic acquisitions.  We can therefore make the following 
prediction: 
Hypothesis 1: Target company shareholders gain more in cross-border than in 
domestic acquisitions (International diversification benefit).  
 
ii) Market Access 
According to Pringle (1991), "FDI into industrial countries has always been 
dominated by ... [one] motive, i.e. market access." (p. 9).  International takeovers may thus 
be motivated by a need to operate locally in order to avoid trade barriers.  This appears to 
have been an important issue in the cross-border takeover activity in Europe following the 
passing of the Single European Act in 1985, with non-EU companies actively acquiring 
companies within the community before the introduction of the Single European Market in 
1992 (Geroski and Vlassopoulos (1990) and Vasconcellos and Kish (1998)).  If market 
access is valuable to foreign bidders, it may be anticipated that bidding companies from 
countries outside the EU are prepared to pay higher takeover premia than bidders based in 
the UK or other EU member countries.   
Hypothesis 2a: Target company shareholders gain more in cross-border than in 
domestic acquisitions (UK market access).  
Hypothesis 2b: In cross-border acquisitions into the UK, target company 
shareholders gain more in acquisitions by companies based outside 
the EU than in acquisitions by EU based bidders (EU market 
access).  
 
iii) Exchange Rate Effects 
 Swenson (1993) and Vasconcellos and Kish (1998) note that the level of cross-
border acquisitions into the US was higher at "...times when the U.S. dollar was relatively 
weak" (Swenson, p. 258).  Froot and Stein (1991) argue that, due to information 
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asymmetries, external financing is costly.  Thus, the higher the wealth of the entrepreneur, 
the lower her cost of capital.  If "...foreigners hold more of their wealth in nondollar-
denominated form, a depreciation of the dollar increases the relative wealth position of 
foreigners and hence lowers their relative cost of capital.  This allows them to bid more 
aggressively for assets". (p. 1194).  Exchange rate fluctuations might also have an impact 
on the level of abnormal returns to target company shareholders in cross-border 
acquisitions.  Servaes and Zenner (1990), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson (1993) 
and Kang (1993) all find US target company shareholders to gain more in cross-border 
acquisitions when the currency of the predator's home country is ‘strong’ relative to the 
target company's currency. 
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) "...measure the strength of the buyer's home currency 
relative to the U.S. dollar as the proportionate deviation from the average exchange rate for 
the sample period" (p. 832), while Swenson (1993) applies a dummy variable approach 
whereby the currency is classified as strong if, at the time of the bid, the exchange rate is 
above the average exchange rate for the sample period.  Such approaches allow for an ex 
post classification of the strength of the currency, but suffer from a reliance on data 
unavailable at the time of the acquisition. 
Not all studies find support for the exchange rate effect.  For example, Cebenoyan et 
al. (1992), Feils (1993), and Dewenter (1995a) do not find the strength of the currency to 
have a significant impact on the level of abnormal returns.  Morgan and Morgan (1990) 
argue that "when a currency fluctuates ... there are bound to be times at which it is under-
valued, and these will provide bargain-hunting opportunities for overseas companies". (p. 
66).  However, Cakici et al. (1991) argue that "while a devalued dollar might enable the 
foreign buyer to acquire an American firm at a discount, the dollar cash flows subsequent to 
the merger are correspondingly less valuable when converted back into the foreign 
currency at the current exchange rate.  Thus, a low foreign exchange value of the dollar 
does not justify high prices for American target firms". (p. 45).  Similar arguments are put 
forward by Vasconcellos and Kish (1998).  The theoretical issue of whether exchange rates 
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have an impact on the level of abnormal returns to target company shareholders thus 
remains a controversial issue, and the empirical evidence is mixed.  However, based on the 
majority of prior evidence, we make the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: In cross-border acquisitions, target company abnormal returns are 
higher when Sterling is relatively weak against the currency of the 
overseas bidder. (Exchange rate benefit).  
 
iv) Managerial Factors 
As with domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions may not only be driven by 
shareholder wealth maximization objectives, but may also be a result of agency conflict, 
with bidding company management aiming to maximize their own utility.  Through 
acquisitions, management may increase their power, status, and salary.  In an analysis of 
domestic UK acquisitions, Firth (1991) find acquiring company management to gain from 
mergers and acquisitions regardless of whether their shareholders gain or lose as a result 
of the transactions.  If managers are pursuing power and status through empire building, 
cross-border acquisitions may be more advantageous to managers than domestic 
transactions. 
In his hubris hypothesis, Roll (1986) argues that bidding companies tend to 
overestimate the value of synergies or other economic benefits of the merger.  The target 
company bid premium may thus be the result of valuation error.  If overseas companies are 
more difficult to value than domestic firms due to e.g., different accounting standards, 
valuation conventions, or the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on company value 
(Solnik (1996) and Shapiro (1999)), the size of any valuation error (and thus, the degree of 
any overpayment) may be larger in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions. 
In an analysis of cross-border acquisitions into the UK, Danbolt (1995) finds that 
overseas bidding companies suffer significant negative abnormal returns, indicating that 
overseas bidders pay too high a price for their UK targets.  Indeed, the post-bid 
performance of cross-border bidders appears to be significantly worse than the 
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performance of domestic UK bidders (Danbolt (1996)).  This suggests that any target 
company cross-border effect may be due to managerial overconfidence (consistent with 
Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis) or managers of cross-border bidders pursuing the 
maximization of personal utility, rather than the maximization of shareholder wealth, to a 
greater extent than do domestic bidders. 
Hypothesis 4: Target company shareholders gain more in cross-border than in 
domestic acquisitions (Managerial motives or hubris).  
 
 As can be seen from the above hypotheses, there are various competing theories as 
to why target company shareholders may gain more in cross-border than in domestic 
acquisitions.  If there is a target company cross-border effect, it is difficult to ascertain why 
this is the case, given that several of the hypotheses (1, 2a and 4) provide identical 
predictions.  However, in section VI we test the EU market access hypothesis (2b) and the 
exchange rate effect hypothesis (3) in an attempt to ascertain whether these factors 
account for the target company cross-border effect.  
 
III. TARGET COMPANY CROSS-BORDER EFFECTS - PRIOR EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE 
The literature on domestic mergers and acquisitions in the UK (e.g., Franks and 
Harris (1989) and Limmack (1991)) as well as the evidence from other markets (such as 
e.g., Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Franks et al. (1991) for the US) invariably indicate that 
large abnormal returns accrue to target company shareholders.  Although one would 
expect target company shareholders to gain significantly also in cross-border acquisitions, 
the level of such gains may, as explained in the previous section, be systematically 
different from those associated with domestic acquisitions. 
For the US market, positive target company cross-border effects are found by e.g., 
Wansley et al. (1983), Tessema (1985), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Shaked et al. 
(1991), Cebenoyan et al. (1992), Marr et al. (1993), Swenson (1993), and Cheng and Chan 
 
 - 9 - 
                                           
(1995), although Dewenter (1995a) does not find the abnormal returns to US target 
company shareholders to be systematically different in domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions. 
With regard to the UK market, it appears that only two previous studies have 
analyzed the wealth effects to target company shareholders from cross-border acquisitions 
into the UK2.  However, neither of these articles analyze the differential wealth effects to 
target company shareholders associated with domestic and cross-border acquisitions (i.e., 
target company cross-border effects).  Conn and Connell (1990) analyze the abnormal 
returns of both bidding and target companies in cross-border mergers between US and UK 
companies during the 1971 to 1980 period.  Over a ten month period leading up to and 
including the bid month, the market model non-logarithmic cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) to UK targets amount to 18%.  The level of CAR to UK target company shareholders 
is, according to Conn and Connell, low not only in comparison to the gains to US targets 
(40% over the same time period), but also low in comparison to what is generally found in 
studies of domestic acquisitions in the UK. 
A similar study to that of Conn and Connell (1990) is that of Feils (1993), who 
analyze target and bidding companies in cross-border acquisitions between the UK and the 
US, as well as German acquisitions of US firms during the time period 1980 to 1990.  Using 
the market model for an 11-day event window (∀5 days relative to the day of the bid 
announcement), she concludes that UK target company shareholders gain significantly less 
(cumulative log abnormal returns of 16.33%) than do US target company shareholders 
(25.52%) in cross-border acquisitions between the two markets.  As with Conn and Connell 
(1990), Feils does not analyze UK target companies in domestic acquisitions, and is thus 
unable to comment upon the nature of any target company cross-border effects in the UK. 
Prior studies tend to find US target company shareholders to gain more in cross-
border than in domestic acquisitions.  However, the low level of abnormal returns to target 
 
2. Connell and Conn (1993) also discuss cross-border acquisitions.  This is, however, 
predominately a methodological paper, and use the same data as in Conn and 
Connell (1990). 
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company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions into the UK (as reported by Conn and 
Connell (1990) and Feils (1993)), may suggest that the presence of a similar target 
company cross-border effect in the UK is unlikely.  In this paper we explicitly test whether 
the level of abnormal returns to shareholders in listed UK companies targeted in cross-
border and domestic acquisitions are systematically different. 
 
IV. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
This paper contains an analysis of 116 cross-border and 510 domestic takeover bids 
for listed UK companies made on or after 1 January 1986 and for which the bid outcome 
was known prior to the end of December 19913.  Information as to what takeover bids took 
place, the name of the bidding and target companies, the nationality of the bidder, the bid 
outcome, whether or not the bid was competitive, or revised, the form of payment offered, 
and the percentage stake by the bidding company in the target at the time of the bid 
 
3. These sample sizes refer to those for the index model.  Due to their more stringent 
data requirements, the sample sizes for the other test models are somewhat lower, 
as specified in the tables.  During the six year period of analysis, 756 domestic and 
208 cross-border takeover bids were announced.  However, as the analysis is 
based on ordinary shares, 3 domestic bids for preference shares are excluded from 
the analysis.  In addition, partial takeover bids (5 cross-border and 8 domestic) are 
excluded, as these bids require special dispensation from the Takeover Code (The 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (1990)); as is common in event studies (e.g., 
Dimson and Fraletti (1986), bids for investment trusts (9 cross-border and 43 
domestic) are excluded due to different valuation issues relating to such companies; 
bids for water companies (13 cross-border and 6 domestic) are excluded as such 
bids are strictly regulated through the Water Act 1989 (DTI (1991); bids where two 
or more companies jointly bid for the target (2 cross-border and 9 domestic) are 
excluded, as are (1 cross-border and 3 domestic) follow-on bids by the same bidder 
for the same target within a twelve month period.  In competitive bids, bids by 
unsuccessful bidders (or the second and subsequent bidders where no bidder was 
successful) are excluded from the analysis (17 cross-border and 38 domestic).  In 
addition, competitive bids involving both domestic and cross-border bidders are also 
excluded (7 cross-border and 10 domestic), as these transactions do not allow for a 
clear analysis of any target company cross-border effect.  Finally, bids where the 
Acquisitions Monthly listing (4 cross-border and 15 domestic) is incomplete is 
excluded from the analysis.  Following this screening process, 150 cross-border 
and 621 domestic bids remain.  Lack of return data further reduce the sample to 
119 cross-border and 520 domestic takeover bids.  The abnormal returns (CAR 
from t-2 to t+1) are more than 3 standard deviations away from the mean (with at 
least 2 of the 5 test models) for 3 cross-border and 10 domestic bids.  These 
outliers are removed. 
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announcement (the toehold), is obtained from Acquisitions Monthly, while exchange rate 
data is obtained from Datastream.  Market capitalizations of equity are obtained from the 
London Business School Risk Measurement Service (edited by Dimson and Marsh)4, while 
monthly log returns are obtained from the London Business School Share Price Database. 
For the majority of the bidding companies, we adopt the classification of nationality 
used by Acquisitions Monthly (which classifies the bidding companies according to where 
they, or their parent companies if the bidding company is a subsidiary, have their registered 
office).  However, where the bidding company is not listed in its home market but listed 
elsewhere, the nationality of the bidder is reclassified to the country of the main stock 
market listing of the company5. 
The analysis is based on event-study methodology (Fama et al. (1969)), where the 
abnormal return on share i is defined as: 
ARi =  Ri - E(Ri) (1) 
where ARi refers to the abnormal return, Ri to the observed return, and E(Ri) to the return 
one would have expected on share i had no takeover bid been announced. 
However, controversy surrounds the specification of the appropriate benchmark 
model for estimating the expected return.  While the market model is probably the most 
commonly applied model in the analysis of mergers and acquisitions, researchers such as 
Connell and Conn (1993) and Gregory (1997) suggest that this model has certain 
limitations, particularly regarding the assumption of stationary α and β values.  In addition, 
while simulation studies suggest that abnormal returns are relatively insensitive to the 
detailed model specification (e.g., Brown and Warner (1980, 1985)), several empirical 
studies find the results to vary significantly depending on the model applied (e.g., Franks 
 
4.  Market values are obtained from the quarterly issue published 6 to 9 month prior to 
the bid announcement, in order to ensure that the values are not influenced by 
rumours regarding the forthcoming bid announcement. 
5. The nationalities of the bidding companies in the 116 cross-border acquisitions are: 
Australia (11), Belgium (1), Canada (2), Eire (4), Finland (1), France (16), Germany 
(8), Hong Kong (1), Japan (6), Liechtenstein (3), Netherlands (6), New Zealand (9), 
South Africa (2), Saudi Arabia (1), Sweden (12), Switzerland (10), and US (23). 
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and Harris (1989) and Danbolt (1995, 1996)).  It is therefore common to apply several 
models6 to test the robustness of the findings.   
In this study we use five different test models.  Firstly, following Franks and Harris 
(1989), we apply the market model (MM), the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the 
index model (IM).  Using these commonly adopted models allow for a comparison of the 
results in this study to those obtained in other studies using these models.  However, as 
argued by Gregory (1997), “…a ‘good’ benchmark must control for the size effect”. (p. 998). 
 Indeed, controlling for the commonly observed size effect (Banz (1981), Reinganum 
(1981), Keim (1983), and Blume and Stambaug (1983)) in the return generating process 
may be of particular importance in studies of mergers and acquisitions, as target 
companies tend to be small (Kennedy and Limmack (1996), Gregory (1997) and Higson 
and Elliott (1998)). 
In this paper, two such size-adjusted benchmarks are applied in addition to the three 
more conventional models.  The size-deciles (SD) control model compare the return on the 
share to a benchmark derived from a portfolio of companies with similar market 
capitalization to the company in question.  The size deciles are constructed using monthly 
log return data for all UK companies available from Datastream during each month.  Target 
companies are matched with the appropriate size decile returns based on the pre-bid 
market value of the target.  The Hoare-Govett small companies model is a variant of the 
capital asset pricing model including both the overall market index and a stock market 
index for small capitalization companies in the benchmark.  The Hoare-Govett smaller 
companies index is a value-weighted index of the bottom 80% of UK companies by market 
capitalization.  The HGSC model is discussed further in Gregory (1997), who finds the 
 
6.  For example, Danbolt (1995) and Sudarsanam et al. (1996) apply two control 
models (Danbolt use the market model (MM) and the index model (IM), while 
Sudarsanam et al. use the IM and a version of MM with Dimson (1979) thin-trading 
adjusted betas), Franks and Harris (1989) and Danbolt (1996) apply three models 
(the MM, the IM and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)), while Gregory (1997) 
apply six different control models (CAPM, the Dimson and Marsh (1986) risk and 
size adjusted model (DM), a multi-index model based on smaller deciles minus 
larger deciles returns (SML), a multi-index model based on the Hoare Govett smaller 
companies index (HGSC), and the Fama and French (1996) three factor model 
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model to capture abnormal returns well.  The models applied in this study are specified as 
follows: 
IM:  Ri = Rm + µi (2) 
MM:  Ri = αi + βiRm + µi (3) 
CAPM: Ri = Rf + βi(Rm - Rf) + µi (4) 
HGSC: Ri = Rf + β1i(Rm - Rf) + β2i(RHG - Rm) + µi (5) 
SD:  Ri = RSD + µi (6) 
where Ri refers to the return on the share (calculated as Loge[(Pit + Dit)/Pit-1], with Pit 
referring to the share price at time period t and D to dividends), Rf the risk-free interest rate, 
Rm the return on the Financial Times Actuaries index for the UK market, αi and βi 
regression coefficients, RHG the return on the Hoare Govett small companies index, RSD the 
equally weighted return on the deciles portfolio of companies with similar market values to 
the company being analyzed, and µi the error term (the estimated abnormal return during 
the analysis period).  Time periods refer to months relative to the month of the bid 
announcement, which is denoted t.  The MM, CAPM and HGSC parameters are estimated 
on a minimum of 30 observations during the period from t-68 to t-9. 
This study adopts a fairly long analysis period, stretching from month t-8 to t+5.  
Previous literature (e.g., Franks et al. (1977) and Limmack (1991)) find target company 
share prices to rise several months prior to bid announcement.  Adopting a long pre-bid 
analysis period allows us to establish whether the pattern of share price performance 
leading up to the bid differs between domestic and cross-border acquisitions, and to 
analyze whether the pre-bid performance of target companies differs depending on whether 
the bidding company is based in the UK or abroad. 
The inclusion of the post-bid period allows the capture of later price reactions in the 
context of the UK merger timetable regulation which may allow the bid process to extend 
over several months7.   Post-bid data thus allows for an analysis of the impact of 
 
(FF3F)).  
7. For a discussion of UK merger regulation, see Sudarsanam (1995). 
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competitive bids, bid revision, and bid outcome. 
The level of statistical significance of the equally weighted abnormal and cumulative 
abnormal returns in domestic and cross-border acquisitions, is tested using the cross-
sectional t-test (Strong (1992)).  Following Strong (1992), the Patell Standardized Residual 
(PSR) Test (Patell (1976)) is applied for the market model.  The PSR z-scores and MM t-
statistics are generally very similar.  The differences in abnormal returns in cross-border 
and domestic acquisitions is tested using a two-sample difference in mean t-test (Weiss 
and Hassett (1986)).  The level of statistical significance is also tested using the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank nonparametric test of the median.  The level of statistical significance using 
nonparametric statistics is generally similar to those using the t-test, and overall provide 
consistent conclusions to those drawn based on the parametric statistics8. 
Previous studies have identified a number of acquisition characteristics which 
influence the level of target company abnormal returns.  It is possible that any cross-border 
effect simply reflect the different characteristics of companies targeted by domestic and 
foreign bidders or the nature of the bid (Lessard (1993)). These characteristics are 
discussed below and subsequently introduced into the returns models to control for their 
influence.  Summary statistics for the cross-sectional variables included in this study are 
given in Table 1. 
 ======================== 
 Table 1 about here 
 ======================== 
(i) Payment.  In cash-only acquisitions, target company shareholders become 
immediately liable for capital gains tax (CGT) on any inflation-adjusted capital gain 
above the annual tax-free threshold, while if the payment is in loan stock, the CGT 
becomes payable when the loan is repaid (or the loan stock disposed of).  In equity 
bids, no CGT would usually be payable at the time of the acquisition, but rather 
 
8. Notes to the tables highlight cases where parametric and nonparametric statistics 
provide inconclusive results as to the significance of the coefficients. 
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when the new shares in the bidding company are disposed of9.  Consequently, in 
order to compensate for the tax effect, it can be hypothesized that target company 
shareholders demand a higher takeover premium in cash than in equity offers 
(Davidson and Cheng (1997)).  Indeed, prior studies such as Wansley et al.  (1983), 
Huang and Walkling (1987), Franks et al.  (1988), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) 
and Sudarsanam et al.  (1996) do find that target company shareholders gain more 
in cash financed than in equity offers.  Due to the tax advantages of loan note 
alternatives over cash payments, one can also hypothesize that target shareholders 
will settle for lower premia in cash offers with full cash alternatives.  
However, Davidson and Cheng (1997) argue that "[t]here are two 
explanations for the observed difference in abnormal returns between the payment 
methods.  [In addition to tax considerations]... cash bids reduce the asymmetric 
information problem that would be created in an exchange of common stock" (p. 
465).  Travlos (1987), Wansley et al. (1987), Franks et al. (1988), Servaes (1991) 
and Aggrawal et al. (1992) all find bidding company shareholders to experience 
negative abnormal returns following equity financed acquisitions10.  If target 
company shareholders receive payment in the form of shares in the bidder, these 
negative abnormal returns may result in low abnormal returns to target company 
shareholders.  Target shareholders can therefore be expected to gain more in cash 
than in equity offers.  A cash alternative to the equity offer should alleviate some of 
the information problems, thus resulting in higher abnormal returns to target 
company shareholders.   
The payment effect is analyzed by evaluating the impact of the composition 
 
9. For a discussion of the tax implications of the method of payment in UK 
acquisitions, see Sudarsanam (1995). 
10. Factors affecting the decision as to what form of payment to offer include not only 
tax considerations and information effects.  As discussed in Martin (1996), other 
aspects affecting the payment decision include managerial ownership and control 
issues, pre-bid share performance, cash balances, the importance of institutional 
shareholders and block holders, and the presence of growth opportunities. 
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of the offer.  The analysis is based on five categories of cash only, cash with full 
loan note alternative, equity only, equity with full cash alternative, and all other 
hybrid forms of payment grouped together in the fifth category.  Given that a 
significantly higher proportion of cross-border than domestic acquisitions are cash 
offers, a payment effect, if present, may account for part of the observed cross-
border effect.  Based on theoretical predictions and the majority of the prior 
evidence, we make the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a: Target company shareholders gain more in cash than in equity 
offers (tax effects and/or information asymmetries). 
Hypothesis 5b: Target company shareholders gain less in cash offers with loan note 
alternatives than in pure cash offers (tax effects). 
Hypothesis 5c: Target company shareholders gain more in equity offers with cash 
alternative than in pure equity offers (information asymmetries). 
 
(ii) Competitive bids.  Studies such as Michel and Shaked (1986), Stulz et al. (1990), 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and De et al. (1996) for domestic US acquisitions, and 
Song (1993) and Swenson (1993) for cross-border acquisitions, find US targets to 
gain substantially more in competitive than in single bidder takeovers contests.  
Dewenter (1995a&b) finds target company shareholders to gain marginally more in 
competitive bids, although not significantly so.  In the UK market, Sudarsanam et al. 
(1996) find, rather surprisingly, target company shareholders to gain marginally less 
where there are multiple bids.  However, all extant research points to a competition 
effect and so a dummy is introduced into the model (where 1=competitive and 0 
otherwise).  A significantly higher proportion of domestic than cross-border bids are 
competitive.  If the effect of bid competition is to increase the offer price, this would 
suggest that domestic rather than cross-border acquisitions should ceteris paribus 
produce the higher abnormal returns. 
Hypothesis 6: Target company shareholders gain more in competitive bids than 
 
 - 17 - 
when only one company bids for the target firm. 
 
(iii) Bid revision.  Franks and Harris (1989) find UK target company shareholders to gain 
significantly more in revised bids, although Limmack (1991) for UK acquisitions and 
De et al. (1996) for the US find bid revision to have relatively little impact on the level 
of abnormal returns to target company shareholders.  A bid revision invariably 
means an improvement in the terms of the offer, either by increasing the value of the 
offer or by adding choice with regard to the form of payment.  Again a dummy is 
introduced into the model (where 1=revised and 0 otherwise) to control for this 
potential factor in the target company premium.  However, as the same proportion of 
domestic and cross-border offers are revised, bid revision is unlikely to account for 
the observed cross-border effect. 
Hypothesis 7: Target company shareholders gain more when the bidder revise the 
terms of the offer. 
 
(iv) Outcome.  In their review paper of domestic US acquisitions, Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) observe that although the level of abnormal returns to target company 
shareholders in failed acquisitions is at least as high as that of successful 
acquisitions at the time of the bid, target company shareholders experience negative 
abnormal returns on the announcement of the unsuccessful bid outcome.  A dummy 
variable (where 1=failed and 0=success) indicates the result of the bid.  While a 
slightly higher proportion of domestic than cross-border offers fail, the difference is 
not statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 8: Target company shareholders gain more in successful than in failed 
acquisitions. 
 
(v) Bid toehold.  The prior evidence with regard to the effect of bidder toehold on target 
company returns is rather mixed.  Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find pre-bid toeholds to 
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have a significant negative impact on the level of abnormal returns to UK target 
company shareholders, although Franks and Harris (1989) find UK target company 
shareholders to gain more when the bidding company hold a large stake (in excess 
of 30%) prior to the bid announcement.  However, as bidding companies with large 
pre-bid stakes require proportionately fewer acceptances at the time of the bid in 
order to obtain control, it is hypothesized that the abnormal returns to target 
company shareholders is inversely related to the proportion of target company 
shares held by the bidding company prior to the acquisition.  Given that pre-bid 
stakes tend to be significantly higher in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions, 
this would suggest ceteris paribus that domestic rather than cross-border 
acquisitions should offer the higher abnormal returns.  The percentage holding in the 
target by the bidder at the time of the bid announcement is used as the control 
variable here. 
Hypothesis 9: Target company shareholders gain less the higher the percentage of 
target company shares owned by the acquiring company prior to the 
takeover bid. 
 
(vi) Size.  As discussed above, the size effect may cause the observed company return 
to be a function of the market value of the company.  In acquisitions, it is also 
possible that bidding companies can afford to be comparatively more generous with 
small targets, thus paying a higher premium to small than to larger target 
companies.  Indeed, Peterson and Peterson (1991) argue that "...smaller [US] target 
firms receive greater absolute returns...". (p. 401).  Consequently, in addition to 
applying size-adjusted models, a size variable (the log of the pre-bid market value) 
is included in the cross-sectional analysis in order to analyze whether target 
company abnormal returns are dependent on the size of the company11.  While 
 
11. Another variable which has in the literature been found to be of some importance, is 
the relative size of the target and bidding companies.  For the UK, Sudarsanam et 
al. (1996) find target company shareholders to gain more when their company is 
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target companies tend to be somewhat larger in cross-border than in domestic 
acquisitions, the difference in average size is not statistically significant. 
Hypothesis 10: The level of abnormal returns to target company shareholders is 
inversely related to the size of the target company. 
 
 As a benchmark for the analysis of the cross-border effect, we first test the validity of 
hypotheses 5 to 10 for the sample of domestic target companies.  We run cross-sectional 
OLS regressions of the target company cumulative abnormal returns over the period t-2 to 
t+1 months against the cross-sectional variables.  The regression equation is specified as 
follows: 
CARi-2,+1 = α + β1Competitive +  β2Revised + β3Outcome 
   + β4Stake% + β5LogMV + β6Cash + β7Cash w/ln 
  + β8Equity + β9Equity w/cash + µ (7) 
where CARi-2,+1 is the cumulative abnormal return on share i over the four month period 
from two months prior to one month after the month of the bid announcement; α the 
constant term; β  the slope coefficients; Competitive a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
the bid was competitive; Revised a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the offer was 
revised; Outcome a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the bid failed; Stake% the 
percentage stake in the target company by the bidding company prior to the bid 
announcement; LogMV the natural logarithm of the pre-bid market capitalization of the 
target company; Cash a dummy variable taking the value 1 for cash-only bids; Cash w/ln a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the payment offered was cash with a full loan note 
alternative; Equity a dummy variable taking the value 1 if shares in the acquiring company 
was the only form of payment offered; Equity w/cash a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
 
small relative to the size of the bidder.  However, in this study, data on the market 
value of the bidding company is missing for 257 target companies.  Inclusion of the 
relative size variable thus significantly reduces sample sizes.  The variable was 
included in the cross-sectional regressions, but the regression coefficient for relative 
size was found to be virtually zero and statistically insignificant.  The regressions 
reported thus exclude this variable. 
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the method of payment offered was equity with a full cash alternative; and µ the error term. 
 We next test whether the target company cross-border effect is attributable to the 
differences in the characteristics of domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  We regress 
the cumulative abnormal returns for the whole sample of domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions on the same cross-sectional variables as in equation 7, but add a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 in cross-border acquisitions.  The regression equation thus 
becomes: 
CARi-2,+1 = α + β1Competitive +  β2Revised + β3Outcome 
   + β4Stake% + β5LogMV + β6Cash + β7Cash w/ln 
  + β8Equity + β9Equity w/cash + π1-4Cross-Border + µ (8) 
A significant coefficient for π1-4 would indicate that the target company cross-border effect 
remains once we control for the bid specific characteristics. 
π1-4 in equation 8 in effect provides a joint test of hypotheses 1 to 4, all of which 
predict that target company shareholders will gain more in cross-border than in domestic 
acquisitions.    In a further cross-sectional regression, this time on the sub-sample of cross-
border targets, we explicitly test two of these hypotheses.  In particular, we test whether 
target shareholders gain more in cross-border acquisitions by companies based outside the 
EU than in other cross-border acquisitions (the EU market access hypothesis, as specified 
in hypothesis 2b), and whether the abnormal returns are related to the relative strength or 
Sterling and the currency of the overseas acquiring company (the exchange rate benefit 
hypothesis, as specified in hypothesis 3).  The regression equation is specified as follows: 
CARi-2,+1 = α + β1Competitive +  β2Revised + β3Outcome 
   + β4Stake% + β5LogMV + β6Cash + β7Cash w/ln 
  + β8Equity + β9Equity w/cash + π2b-1Non-EU European 
  + π2b-2US + π2b-3Rest of World + π3Exchange Rate + µ (9) 
where Non-EU Europe is a dummy variable taking the value 1 in cross-border acquisitions 
by companies based in European countries which were not members of the European 
Union at the time of the bid announcement; US a dummy taking the value 1 in acquisitions 
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by US companies; and Rest of World a dummy variable taking the value 1 in cross-border 
acquisitions by companies located outside of Europe or the US.  Cross-border acquisitions 
by companies based in other EU member states are captured by the intercept. 
The Exchange Rate variable measures the deviation in the exchange rate between 
Sterling and the home currency of the overseas acquiring company during the month of the 
bid announcement from the mean exchange rate during the previous two years.  This 
definition of the exchange rate variable uses only information available to the bidder at the 
time of the bid, therefore avoiding the problem of hindsight present in the exchange rate 
variables applied by e.g., Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) and Svenson (1993). 
 Significant positive coefficients for π2b-1, π2b-2, and π2b-3 would indicate support for 
hypothesis 2b, while a significant positive coefficient for π3 would indicate support for 
hypothesis 3. 
Multicollinearity problems may occur if the independent variables are highly 
correlated.  The correlation matrix reported in the appendix indicate that multicollinearity is 
unlikely to affect the regression coefficients in this analysis.  While some of the correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant, the coefficients are generally small.  However, in 
order to test the robustness of our results, we analyze the effect of multicollinearity by 
means of the variance inflation factors (VIF) (Montgomery and Peck (1982)). The variance 
inflation factor for each regression coefficient xj is calculated as: 
 VIFj   = 1/(1-Rj2)       (10) 
where Rj2 is the multiple correlation coefficient of xj regressed on the remaining explanatory 
variable (Belsley et al. (1980)).  As argued by Chatterjee and Price (1991), “values of 
variance inflation factors greater than 10 is often taken as a signal that the data have 
collinearity problems”. (p. 191).  While the maximum VIF coefficient in our analysis is 4.3, 
the vast majority of the VIF scores are below 1.5.  Our cross sectional regression results 
are therefore not adversely affected by multicollinearity.   
Similarly, we test that our results are not driven by heteroskedasticity using the Park 
test (Park (1966), Gujarati (1988)), where the square of the regression residuals are 
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regressed against the independent variables.  For example, the Park test of the cross-
sectional regression for domestic targets (equation 7 above) is specified as follows: 
µ2  =  α + β1Competitive +  β2Revised + β3Outcome 
  + β4Stake% + β5LogMV + β6Cash + β7Cash w/ln 
  + β8Equity + β9Equity w/cash + , (11) 
where µ2 refers to the squared residuals from the regression analysis using equation 7.  As 
can be seen from tables 5 to 7, none of the Park test regressions are significant.  We can 
therefore conclude that there is no heteriskediasticity in the error variance. 
As a further robustness check, all the cross-sectional regressions are run using 
robust (rank) regressions in addition to the OLS.  The results from these regressions are 
very similar to those obtained using OLS (both in terms of the levels of the coefficients and 
their significance levels), indicating that our results are not affected by our assumption of 
normally distributed abnormal returns12. 
 
V. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Target Company Shareholders in Domestic Acquisitions 
The average abnormal returns to the listed UK companies targeted in domestic 
acquisitions during the 1986-1991 period, are detailed in Table 2.  As can be clearly seen 
from this table, target companies in domestic acquisitions substantially under perform 
during the pre-bid period, with all models indicating negative abnormal returns in every 
month from t-8 to t-3.  It is inappropriate to directly attribute these large negative abnormal 
returns during the pre-bid period to the forthcoming bid announcements.  A more plausible 
explanation is that bidding companies target companies with at least a short-term history of 
poor share price performance.  The abnormal returns turn positive in month t-2, and during 
t-1 and t significant positive abnormal returns accrue to target company shareholders in 
domestic UK acquisitions.  The abnormal returns during the month of the bid 
 
12. Notes to the tables highlight cases where parametric and nonparametric statistics 
provide inconclusive results as to the significance of the coefficients. 
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announcement amount to a highly significant 18.35% to 20.13%, depending on the test 
model applied.  Targets tend to encounter negative abnormal returns during the months 
following the bid announcement, although these are mostly relatively small. 
 ======================== 
 Table 2 about here 
 ======================== 
 
Target Company Shareholders in Cross-Border Acquisitions 
The average abnormal returns to UK target companies in cross-border acquisitions 
into the UK are given in Table 3.  As is the case with target companies in domestic 
acquisitions, cross-border targets also, on average, under perform during the period from t-
8 to t-3.  However, unlike what is the case for domestic targets, the abnormal returns are 
significantly positive as early as two months prior to the bid announcement.  These results 
indicate that cross-border acquisitions tend to be anticipated by the market earlier than are 
domestic acquisitions.  These large pre-bid abnormal returns in cross-border acquisitions 
highlight the potential limitation of several previous studies such as Tessema (1985), Feils 
(1993), and Eun et al. (1995) which apply short event windows to the analysis of abnormal 
returns to target companies in cross-border acquisitions. 
 ======================== 
 Table 3 about here 
 ======================== 
During the month of the bid announcement, the average abnormal return amounts to 
somewhere between 19.21% and 21.38% (depending on the test model applied), and is 
highly significant with all models.  Significant positive abnormal returns are also observed 
for the month following the initial bid announcement13.  This may be due to bid revision or 
 
 
13. During the post-bid period, a large proportion of target companies are no longer 
listed.  When share returns are missing, the abnormal return has been assumed to 
be zero.  While the mean abnormal return is significant during some of the post-bid 
periods, the large number of zeros cause the medians to be indistinguishable from 
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the bid turning competitive.  The effect of these and other bid characteristics on the level of 
abnormal returns is analyzed in the cross-sectional analysis. 
 
Target Company Cross-Border Effects 
The differences in average abnormal returns to shareholders in the 116 cross-border 
and the 510 domestic acquisitions, are given in Table 4.  As discussed above, UK target 
companies in both cross-border and domestic acquisitions significantly under perform over 
the period from 8 to 3 months prior to the month of the bid announcement.  The differences 
in abnormal returns during these pre-bid months are generally small and not statistically 
significant. 
 ======================== 
 Table 4 about here 
 ======================== 
During the month of the bid announcement, there appears to be no significant cross-
border effect.  However, UK targets in cross-border acquisitions gain more than target 
company shareholders in domestic transactions during the two months leading up to the 
bid, as well as the month after the bid announcement.  A positive, although fairly small, 
cross-border effect is also observed for month t+2. 
The appropriate event window for analyzing the effect on shareholder returns of 
mergers and acquisitions is controversial.  While long windows may introduce noise, short 
windows are unlikely to capture the full effect of the transaction if there is bid leakage or if 
price sensitive information is released after the initial bid announcement, such as the 
announcement of bid outcome, bid revision, or the entry of other companies in the bidding 
contest.  However, in this paper, where the focus is on the difference in the level of 
abnormal returns to target company shareholders in domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions (i.e., the target company cross-border effect), a fairly agnostic view can be 
taken with regard to what event window is the most appropriate.  From Table 4, it can be 
 
zero.   
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seen that the cross-border effect appears to be most prominent during the time period from 
t-2 to t+1.  Cumulating the abnormal returns over these four months produce a cumulative 
cross-border effect of somewhere between 5.99% and 11.03%, statistically significant with 
all test models.  The main aim of the cross-sectional analysis is to establish whether the 
cross-border effect is attributable to the different characteristics of domestic and cross-
border takeover bids, and to test our hypotheses as to why a target company cross-border 
effect may exist.  Consequently, we base this analysis on the cumulative abnormal returns 
from t-2 to t+1, although it is acknowledged that this event window (ending one month after 
the month of the bid announcement) is unlikely to capture the full effect of bid outcome, bid 
revision or competitive bids14. 
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Abnormal Returns in Domestic Acquisitions 
We first test the significance of these bid specific variables for our sample of 
domestic acquisitions.  The regression output from the cross-sectional analysis is reported 
in Table 5.  During the four month period from t-2 to t+1, target company shareholders gain 
significantly more in competitive bids15.  This is consistent with the majority of prior US 
evidence, although contrary to Sudarsanam et al.'s (1996) finding for the UK.  Shareholders 
of domestic target companies are also found to gain more in revised bids, while the level of 
abnormal returns is lower for targets in failed bids.  We thus find support for hypotheses 6 
and 7, and some support for hypothesis 8.  
 
14. The overall results in this study are robust to the specification of the event window.  
With a longer event window from t-2 to t+5, the coefficients for competitive and 
revised bids are significantly positive, while bid outcome and log MV are 
significantly negative.  However, the main conclusions remain unaltered, with the 
dummy for the cross-border effect (see Table 6) being marginally larger (ranging 
from 6.22 to 9.72 percentage points depending on the test model applied) for the 
longer event-window. 
15. This study covers a time period with relatively large numbers of competitive bids, 
and the proportion of domestic bids turning competitive in this study (13.6%) exceed 
what is found in previous UK studies.  For example, Franks and Harris (1989) find 
6% of their targets to be subject to competitive bids, while Sudarsanam et al. (1996) 
find competitive bids to account for 8% of their sample. 
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 ======================== 
 Table 5 about here 
 ======================== 
Due to the limited sample sizes for some of the payment categories, only four of the 
different methods of payment offered can be explicitly tested for in the cross-sectional 
analysis (with the remaining bids being captured by the constant term)16.  Target 
shareholders are found to gain significantly less in equity-only than in other bids.  This is 
consistent with prior research (e.g., Franks et al  (1988) and  Harris and Ravenscraft 
(1991)).  Cash-only bids also appear to be ill received by the market.  This may be due to 
the tax implications of such offers, with target shareholders preferring cash offers with loan 
note alternatives, due to their more favorable tax treatment (Sudarsanam (1995)).  The 
results seem to suggest that the cash-only bids are not sufficiently high (relative to the 
other types of bids) to fully compensate for the adverse tax treatment of such offers.  The 
results thus support hypothesis 5a, but contradict hypotheses 5b and c. 
We find the pre-bid stake of the bidder to have negligible impact on target company 
abnormal returns.  There is thus no support for hypothesis 9.  However, consistent with 
hypothesis 10, we find shareholders in small companies to gain more (in percentage terms) 
than do shareholders in larger companies, suggesting that bidding companies are relatively 
more generous in their acquisitions of small targets.  
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Cross-Border Effect 
In the previous section we established that bid specific variables explain a significant 
proportion of the cross-sectional variation in target company abnormal returns.  In order to 
test whether these bid characteristics account for the target company cross-border effect, 
we repeat the cross-sectional analysis for the whole sample of cross-border and domestic 
 
16. The methods of payment offered in the domestic acquisitions in this study are 
broadly similar to that observed by Sudarsanam et al. (1996) in their study of 
acquisitions in the UK.  In their sample, 16% of the transactions are all-cash 
(compared to 13% in this study), 17% (19%) all-equity, and 67% (70%) mixed-pay 
offers. 
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acquisitions, with a cross-border dummy added to the explanatory variables. 
As can be seen from Table 6, the impact of bid competition  is marginally larger for 
the whole sample than for domestic targets separately (as reported in Table 5).  Target 
company shareholders, on average, encounter an additional abnormal return of 
approximately 9 to 13 percentage points in competitive bids, and 4 to 6 percentage points 
in revised bids.  There is thus strong support for hypotheses 6 and 7. 
 ======================== 
 Table 6 about here 
 ======================== 
The coefficient for company size is negative, indicating that smaller target 
companies receive larger percentage abnormal returns than do larger targets, consistent 
with hypothesis 10.  However, the impact of company size is not statistically significant with 
the size deciles model, indicating that the positive size coefficient may, at least in part, be 
attributable to the stock market size anomaly, rather than solely being due to bidders being 
comparatively generous with small target companies. 
The method of payment appears to have a significant impact on target company 
returns, with cash-only and, in particular, equity-only bids resulting in low abnormal returns. 
 There is thus support for hypothesis 5a, but not for 5b.  However, while bid specific 
variables explain a significant proportion of the cross-sectional variation in target company 
abnormal returns, these variables do not appear to account for the difference in abnormal 
returns associated with cross-border and domestic acquisitions.  Consequently, the cross-
border effect remains highly significant when bid-specific variables are controlled for.  The 
target company cross-border effect in the UK (over the four month period from t-2 to t+1) 
amount to somewhere between 6.02 and 9.17 percentage points, depending on which test 
model is applied. 
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Abnormal Returns in Cross-Border Acquisitions  
The analysis above reveals that the target company cross-border effect is not 
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attributable to the differences in bid characteristics between domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions.  In this section two of the theories put forward in the theoretical framework as 
to why a target company cross-border effect may be present are tested for the sample of 
cross-border acquisitions: the EU market access hypothesis (hypothesis 2b), and the 
exchange rate effect hypothesis (hypothesis 3). 
Location of cross-border bidder.  The takeover bids analyzed in this study took place 
during the time period leading up to the introduction of the Single European Market in 1992. 
 A large proportion of the cross-border bids appears to have been undertaken in order to 
gain access to the European Market, and it can be hypothesized that the cross-border 
effect will be restricted to acquisitions by companies based outside the EU.  The market 
access hypothesis is tested by analyzing whether the level of gains to target company 
shareholders in cross-border acquisitions is dependent upon whether the bidding company 
was based within the EU, in other European countries, in the US, or in other overseas 
countries. 
If the target company cross-border effect is attributable to an EU market access 
premium, one would expect UK target company shareholders to gain more in cross-border 
acquisitions into the EU than in cross-border acquisitions by companies based in EU 
countries.  As can be seen from Table 7, this is not the case.  The coefficients for Non-EU 
European and US are negative for all models, although generally not statistically significant. 
 This suggests that cross-border acquisitions into the UK by US companies or by 
companies located in European countries outside the EU result in lower gains to UK targets 
than do intra-EU acquisitions.  The coefficients for the cross-border acquisitions by 
companies based outside Europe or the US (Rest of World) are small and insignificant.  
Overall, the results do not support the EU market access hypothesis. 
 ======================== 
 Table 7 about here 
 ======================== 
The low gains to UK targets in acquisitions by US bidders may indicate that US 
bidders, possibly due to the competitive nature of the US takeover market (Conn and 
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Connell (1990)), are in some way `better' than other cross-border bidders, making them 
able to acquire UK companies at comparatively low prices.  However, analysis of bidder 
returns in cross-border acquisitions into the UK by Danbolt (1995) indicate that US bidders 
perform no better than other overseas bidders.  The cause of the differential wealth effects 
depending on the location of the overseas bidder still eludes us, and would benefit from 
further research. 
Exchange rate.  As argued in the theoretical framework, it can be hypothesized that 
UK target company shareholders will gain more when Sterling is relatively weak against the 
currency of the overseas bidding company, although the prior evidence is rather mixed. 
The mean exchange rate variable (as reported in Table 1) of 0.0080 is somewhat puzzling, 
indicating that the cross-border acquisitions generally took place when the currency of the 
acquiring company was marginally `weak' (relative to previous levels) against Sterling 
during the bid month. 
It can be seen from Table 7 that the coefficient for the exchange rate variable is not 
statistically significant with any of the five test models.  There is therefore no support for the 
exchange rate hypothesis of UK targets gaining more when the currency of the overseas 
acquiring company is strong. 
The analysis above indicates that the target company cross-border effect is robust to 
the inclusion of bid specific variables in the cross-sectional analysis, and does not appear 
to be attributable to either an EU market access premium nor to exchange rate effects.  
The cause of the target company cross-border effect thus still eludes us.  Possible 
explanations for the differential gains to targets in cross-border and domestic acquisitions 
include a premium for international diversification, or overpayment, either due to hubris or 
to pursuit of managerial objectives rather than the maximization of shareholder wealth.  
Further research, such as an analysis of the joint abnormal returns to targets and bidders in 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions may be required in order to ascertain whether the 
high target company returns in cross-border acquisitions reflect the added value of UK 
targets to overseas bidders, or whether the target company cross-border effect reflects 
overpayment. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has analyzed the abnormal returns to target company shareholders in 
510 domestic and 116 cross-border takeover bids for UK listed companies during the 1986-
1991 period.  Irrespective of the returns benchmark used (the market model (MM), the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the index model (IM), and two size-adjusted models, 
the Hoare-Govett Small Companies model (HGSC), and the size deciles (SD) model), the 
empirical results are similar.  During the period from t-8 to t-3 (where t refers to the month 
of the bid announcement), target company shareholders in both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions suffer negative abnormal returns, indicating that target companies tend to 
under perform prior to the bid announcement.   
During the month of the bid announcement, large and highly significant abnormal 
returns accrue to shareholders in both domestic (18.35% to 20.13%, depending on the test 
model applied) and cross-border targets (19.21% to 21.38%).  However, over the four 
month period from t-2 to t+1, UK target company shareholders gained a significant 5.99 to 
11.03 percentage points more in cross-border than in domestic acquisitions (depending on 
the test model applied). 
The level of abnormal returns is found to depend significantly on the bid 
characteristics, with target company shareholders gaining more in competitive, revised or 
successful bids, where the bidder offers cash with a loan note alternative, and where the 
target company is small.  However, these and other bid characteristics do not appear to 
account for the different levels of abnormal returns associated with domestic and cross-
border acquisitions.  The target company cross-border effect persist at a highly significant 
6.02 to 9.17 percentage points when bid characteristics are controlled for. 
The cross-border effect is not significantly dependent on where the cross-border 
bidder is based, and is not exclusive to cross-border acquisitions by companies based 
outside of the EU.  Thus, while the cross-border effect may be a premium for access to the 
UK market, it does not appear to be attributable to a premium for access to the wider 
European single market.  Similarly, we find no support for the exchange rate effect 
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hypothesis, whereby target company returns would depend on the relative strength of 
Sterling and the currency of the overseas acquiring company.  The cause of the cross-
border effect thus still eludes us, and further research is required to determine whether the 
cross-border effect reflects a rational premium for international diversification, or an 
irrational overpayment consistent with hubris or the pursuit of managerial objectives rather 
than the maximization of shareholder wealth. 
 
Appendix 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Domestic Acquisitions, All Acquisitions (Domestic and Cross-Border), and Cross-Border Acquisitions 
            Cross-
Border 
EU Non-EU US Rest of
World 
Exrate Comp. Revise Outc. Stake% Log MV Cash
only 
Cash 
w/ln alt 
Equity 
only 
 
Non-EU 
          
 
-0.353*** 
 
    
 
US 
             
 
-0.327*** 
 
 
 
-0.267*** 
 
Rest of 
World 
            
 
-0.406*** 
 
 
 
-0.332*** 
 
 
-0.307*** 
 
Exchang
e rate 
           
 
-0.061 
 
 
 
-0.097 
 
 
 0.115 
 
 
 0.051 
 
Competi-
tive 
 
-0.010 
 
 
-0.088 
 
 
 
 0.037 
 
 
 0.146 
 
 
-0.075 
 
 
-0.025 
        
 
Revised 
 
 0.019 
 
 
 0.009 
 
 
 
-0.035 
 
 
-0.074 
 
 
 0.089 
 
 
 0.011 
 0.189*** 
 0.213*** 
 0.319*** 
       
 
Outcome 
 
-0.031 
 
 
-0.128 
 
 
 
-0.136 
 
 
 0.081 
 
 
 0.186** 
 
 
 0.096 
 0.131*** 
 0.112*** 
 0.017 
 
 0.131*** 
 0.149*** 
 0.236** 
      
 
Stake% 
 
 0.192*** 
 
 
-0.127 
 
 
 
 0.075 
 
 
-0.024 
 
 
 0.082 
 
 
 0.125 
-0.048 
-0.063 
-0.108 
-0.027 
-0.041 
-0.101 
-0.073* 
-0.050 
 0.041 
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Appendix – continued 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Domestic Acquisitions, All Acquisitions (Domestic and Cross-Border), and Cross-Border Acquisitions 
            Cross-
Border 
EU Non-EU US Rest of
World 
Exrate Comp. Revise Outc. Stake% Log MV Cash
only 
Cash 
w/ln alt 
Equity 
only 
 
Log MV 
 
 0.125*** 
 
 
-0.001 
 
 
 
-0.036 
 
 
-0.176* 
 
 
 0.189** 
 
 
 0.046 
 0.120*** 
 0.124*** 
 0.167* 
 0.140*** 
 0.147*** 
 0.173* 
 0.208*** 
 0.200*** 
 0.194** 
 0.058 
 0.083** 
 0.072 
    
 
Cash 
only 
 
 0.329*** 
 
 
-0.124 
 
 
 
-0.004 
 
 
 0.056 
 
 
 0.081 
 
 
 0.025 
 0.036 
 0.018 
-0.019 
 0.086* 
 0.048 
-0.073 
 0.033 
-0.005 
-0.080 
 0.198*** 
 0.239*** 
 0.173* 
-0.127*** 
-0.131*** 
-0.365*** 
   
 
Cash w/ln 
alt 
 
 0.339*** 
 
 
 0.035 
 
 
 
 0.033 
 
 
 0.004 
 
 
-0.070 
 
 
-0.111 
-0.041 
-0.031 
-0.001 
-0.011 
-0.012 
-0.045 
-0.108** 
-0.073* 
 0.052 
 0.085* 
 0.051 
-0.197** 
 0.074* 
 0.132*** 
 0.168* 
-0.134*** 
-0.218*** 
-0.812*** 
  
 
Equity 
only 
 
-0.192*** 
 
 
0.142 
 
 
 
-0.050 
 
 
 0.046 
 
 
-0.058 
 
 
-0.131 
-0.047 
-0.041 
-0.024 
-0.070 
-0.067* 
-0.037 
-0.045 
-0.035 
-0.035 
-0.104** 
-0.121*** 
-0.059 
-0.033 
-0.049 
 0.077 
-0.186*** 
-0.208*** 
-0.087 
-0.165*** 
-0.190*** 
-0.081 
 
 
Equity 
w/cash 
alt 
 
-0.250*** 
      0.018 -0.006 
 0.018 -0.010 
-0.101** 
-0.082** 
-0.092** 
-0.119*** 
-0.183*** 
-0.190*** 
-0.233*** 
-0.257*** 
-0.206*** 
-0.234*** 
-0.287*** 
-0.223*** 
The table contains Pearson correlation coefficients between the dependent variables.  The top numbers (in normal typeface) refer to the sample of domestic acquisitions for the index model, 
giving a sample of 507 observations.  (These correlation coefficients thus relate to the IM regressions in Table 5). The numbers in the middle (in bold) refer to the full sample of domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions for the index model, giving a sample of 621 observations.  (These correlation coefficients thus relate to the IM regressions in Table 6). The bottom numbers (in italics) 
refer to the sample of cross-border acquisitions for the index model, giving a sample of 114 observations.  (These correlation coefficients thus relate to the IM regressions in Table 7).  *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance, respectively   
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics 
   Cross-Border Domestic 
Sample   116 510 
Region EU 30.2% 
 Non-EU European 22.4% 
 US 19.8% 
 Rest of the World 27.6% 
 
Payment Cash bids 94.0% 29.4%  a,d)  *** 
  Cash only 46.6% 13.1% 
   
  Cash w/full loan alt. 43.1% 10.6% 
  Cash w/other alts. 4.3% 5.7% 
 Equity bids 1.7% 49.2% 
  Equity only 0.9% 18.6% 
  Equity w/full cash alt. 0.0% 26.5% 
  Equity w/other alts. 0.9% 4.1% 
 Mixed and other bids 4.3% 21.4% 
  Cash&equity only 2.6% 3.1% 
  Cash&equity w/full cash alt. 0.0% 3.7% 
  Cash&equity w/other alts. 0.0% 1.8% 
  Other bids 1.7% 12.8% 
Competitive Single bidder 94.0% 86.2%  a) * 
 Multiple bidders 6.0% 13.6% 
Revised Not revised 86.2% 86.2%  a)   
 Offer revised 13.8% 13.8% 
Outcome Successful 87.9% 79.9%  a) 
 Failed 12.1% 20.1% 
 Stake No pre-bid sake 56.0% 76.2%  a) *** 
 Pre-bid stake 44.0% 23.8% 
 Stake% Mean stake (all companies) 15.2% 6.4%  b) *** 
 MV Mean pre-bid market value ,151.8m ,104.6m   b)
 Ex rate Mean exchange rate value 0.0080 n.a.   c)
EU refers to cross-border bids by companies based in countries which were members of the European 
Community at the time of the acquisition, Non-EU European to bids by companies based in other 
European countries, US to bids by US companies, and Rest of the World to acquisitions by companies 
based outside of Europe and the US.  The method of payment is classified depending on the method of 
payment offered in the final bid.  Loan alt refers to where the offer contained a full loan note alternative. 
 Competitive is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if there was a single bidder and 1 if more than one 
company bid for the target (competitive bid), Revised is a dummy variable taking the value 0 if the offer 
was not revised and 1 if the terms of the offer were revised (terms of the offer improved by increasing 
the offer price and/or adding more choice with regard to the method of payment), Outcome is a dummy 
variable taking the value 0 if the bid was successful (in that the bidding company obtained control of the 
target company) and 1 if the offer failed, Stake % refers to the percentage holding by the bidding 
company in the target company at the time of the bid announcement, MV is the pre-bid market 
capitalization of equity of the target company (in the cross-sectional analysis the log of the MV is used), 
and Exchange rate refers to the deviation from the average exchange rate over the two year period 
prior to the month of the bid announcement (values below zero indicating foreign exchange rate being 
`strong' (compared to previous exchange rates) relative to Sterling).  *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance, respectively.  Tested using a) Chi-squared, b) 
difference of mean t-test, and c) t-test.  d) Differences in the method of payment offered in domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions is tested using the three headline pay categories and the ten pay 
subcategories (both tests highly statistically significant). 
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Table 2 
Domestic Acquisitions 
Month      IM     MM   CAPM HGSC     SD  
Sample 
 
    510 
 
    389 
 
    389 
 
    389 
 
    507 
      
t-8 -0.0136*** -0.0168*** -0.0140** -0.0157*** -0.0167*** 
t-7 -0.0115** -0.0088 -0.0063 -0.0060 -0.0151*** 
t-6 -0.0038 -0.0068c -0.0045 -0.0090c -0.0107** 
t-5 -0.0054 -0.0042 -0.0019 -0.0064 -0.0112** 
t-4 -0.0074 -0.0042 -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0127*** 
t-3 -0.0155*** -0.0172*** -0.0152** -0.0167*** -0.0231*** 
t-2  0.0075  0.0106  0.0128*  0.0077  0.0019 
t-1  0.0381***  0.0392***  0.0415***  0.0366***  0.0293*** 
t  0.1939***  0.1990***  0.2013***  0.1973***  0.1835*** 
t+1  0.0014 -0.0023  0.0004 -0.0036 -0.0059 
t+2 -0.0027 -0.0039 -0.0028 -0.0049 -0.0059*b
t+3 -0.0058***b -0.0067**b -0.0061**b -0.0062**b -0.0055**b
t+4 -0.0037 -0.0058 -0.0053 -0.0060*b -0.0058**b
t+5  0.0013  0.0017  0.0023  0.0019  0.0000 
Average abnormal returns to shareholders of UK companies which received domestic takeover bids.  
The abnormal returns are calculated using 5 different test models: IM refers to the index model, MM to 
the market model, CAPM to the capital asset pricing model, HGSC to the Hoare Govett small companies 
index model, and SD to the size deciles index model (Models as specified in equations 1-5).  Time 
periods refer to months relative to the month of the bid announcement, which is denoted t.  Not all target 
companies remained listed during the months following the takeover bids.  In these cases, the return on 
the share has been assumed to be equal to the benchmark (i.e., abnormal return of zero). The level of 
statistical significance of the equally weighted cumulative abnormal returns, is tested using the cross-
sectional t-test (Strong (1992)).  Following Strong (1992), the Patell Standardized Residual (PSR) Test 
(Patell (1976)) is applied for the market model.   *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% 
and 99% level of significance, respectively.  b) While significant using parametric statistics, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant using Wilcoxon signed-rank nonparametric test of the median. c) 
While not significant using parametric statistics, the coefficient is statistically significant using Wilcoxon 
igned-rank nonparametric test of the median.  s 
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Table 3 
Cross-Border Acquisitions 
Month      IM     MM   CAPM   HGSC   SD  
Sample 
 
    116 
 
     96 
 
     96 
 
    96 
 
  114 
      
t-8 -0.0152c -0.0167 -0.0200* -0.0164 -0.0120 
t-7 -0.0131 -0.0037 -0.0055 -0.0030 -0.0096 
t-6 -0.0023  0.0030  0.0047  0.0045 -0.0025 
t-5 -0.0188*b -0.0080 -0.0074 -0.0028 -0.0126 
t-4 -0.0272** -0.0135 -0.0168 -0.0095 -0.0186 
t-3 -0.0222** -0.0097 -0.0116 -0.0053 -0.0195** 
t-2  0.0307**b  0.0254*b  0.0221  0.0301*b  0.0343** 
t-1  0.0666***  0.0691***  0.0659***  0.0672***  0.0644*** 
t  0.1928***  0.2138***  0.2033***  0.2102***  0.1921*** 
t+1  0.0224**b  0.0104  0.0246*b  0.0161  0.0283**b
t+2  0.0045  0.0041  0.0015  0.0075  0.0092 
t+3 -0.0110***b -0.0130***b -0.0094**b -0.0115**b -0.0104***b
t+4 -0.0087*b -0.0106*b -0.0108*b -0.0084 -0.0072 
t+5  0.0021  0.0014  0.0018  0.0003 -0.0012 
Average abnormal returns to shareholders of UK companies which received takeover bids from 
overseas companies.  The abnormal returns are calculated using 5 different test models: IM refers to 
the index model, MM to the market model, CAPM to the capital asset pricing model, HGSC to the 
Hoare Govett small companies index model, and SD to the size deciles index model (Models as 
specified in equations 1-5).  Time periods refer to months relative to the month of the bid 
announcement, which is denoted t.  Not all target companies remained listed during the months 
following the takeover bids.  In these cases, the return on the share has been assumed to be equal to 
the benchmark (i.e., abnormal return of zero).  Following Strong (1992), the Patell Standardized 
Residual (PSR) Test (Patell (1976)) is applied for the market model.  *,**, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance, respectively.  b) While significant using 
parametric statistics, the coefficient is not statistically significant using Wilcoxon signed-rank 
nonparametric test of the median. c) While not significant using parametric statistics, the coefficient is 
tatistically significant using Wilcoxon signed-rank nonparametric test of the median. s 
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Table 4 
Cross-Border Effect 
Month      IM    MM   CAPM  HGSC     SD 
Sample     626     485     485     485     621 
      
t-8 -0.0016  0.0001 -0.0060 -0.0007  0.0047 
t-7 -0.0016  0.0051  0.0008  0.0030  0.0055 
t-6  0.0015  0.0098  0.0092  0.0135  0.0082 
t-5 -0.0134 -0.0038 -0.0056  0.0036 -0.0011 
t-4 -0.0198 -0.0093 -0.0151 -0.0071 -0.0059 
t-3 -0.0067  0.0075  0.0036  0.0115  0.0036 
t-2  0.0232  0.0148  0.0093  0.0225  0.0324** 
t-1  0.0286*  0.0299*  0.0244  0.0306*  0.0351** 
t -0.0011  0.0148  0.0020  0.0130  0.0086 
t+1  0.0210*  0.0127  0.0242*  0.0197*  0.0342*** 
t+2  0.0072  0.0080  0.0044  0.0123  0.0151** 
t+3 -0.0051 -0.0063 -0.0033 -0.0053 -0.0049 
t+4 -0.0051 -0.0048 -0.0056 -0.0023 -0.0013 
t+5  0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0012 
Average abnormal returns to shareholders of UK companies which received takeover bids from 
overseas companies less the abnormal returns to UK target shareholders in domestic acquisition 
(Target company cross-border effect).  The abnormal returns are calculated using 5 different test 
models: IM refers to the index model, MM to the market model, CAPM to the capital asset pricing 
model, HGSC to the Hoare Govett small companies index model, and SD to the size deciles index 
model (Models as specified in equations 1-5).  Time periods refer to months relative to the month of the 
bid announcement, which is denoted t.  Not all target companies remained listed during the months 
following the takeover bids.  In these cases, the return on the share has been assumed to be equal to 
the benchmark (i.e., abnormal return of zero).  The differences in abnormal returns in cross-border and 
domestic acquisitions is tested using a two-sample difference in mean t-test (Weiss and Hassett 
(1986)).   *,**, and *** indicate statistical significance at 90%, 95% and 99% level of significance, 
espectively. r 
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Table 5 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of CAR-2,+1 
Domestic Targets 
      IM MM CAPM HGSC SD
      
Coef. 
p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value  VIF
Constant  0.3171 0.000   0.3611 0.000   0.3535 0.000   0.3383 0.000   0.2639 0.000  
Competitive  0.1173 0.010 1.1  0.0871 0.054 1.1  0.1037 0.022 1.1  0.0841 0.055 1.1  0.0861b 0.064  1.1
Revised  0.0702 0.045 1.1  0.0633 0.069 1.1  0.0572 0.100 1.1  0.0567 0.094 1.1  0.0691 0.050 1.1 
Outcome               -0.0639 0.051 1.1 -0.0254 0.446 1.1 -0.0313 0.346 1.1 -0.0347 0.284 1.1 -0.0540 0.099 1.1
Stake% -0.0001              0.926 1.1 -0.0002 0.772 1.1 -0.0001 0.924 1.1 -0.0000 0.933 1.1 -0.0004 0.558 1.1
Log MV               -0.0176 0.024 1.2 -0.0295 0.000 1.2 -0.0230 0.005 1.2 -0.0212 0.008 1.2 -0.0054 0.490 1.2
Cash only               -0.0509 0.181 1.4 -0.0953 0.019 1.4 -0.1119 0.006 1.4 -0.1135 0.004 1.4 -0.0605 0.114 1.4
Cash w/ln alt  0.0291 0.469 1.2  0.0288 0.542 1.2  0.0318 0.501 1.2  0.0552 0.230 1.2  0.0736 0.068 1.2 
Equity only -0.1411              0.000 1.3 -0.0952 0.010 1.3 -0.1132 0.002 1.3 -0.1265 0.000 1.3 -0.1654 0.000 1.4
Equity w/cash alt  0.0133 0.663 1.5  0.0039 0.905 1.5  0.0032 0.921 1.5 -0.0181 0.570 1.5 -0.0378 0.215 1.5 
Observationsa    507      386      386      386      507   
Adjusted R2    7.3%      6.0%      6.4%      6.7%      7.5%   
F-value    5.40 0.000     3.75 0.000     3.95 0.000     4.05 0.000     5.56 0.000  
Park-test F-value    1.12 0.345     1.09 0.372     1.10 0.364     0.99 0.451     0.52 0.857  
Table contains regression output from cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (over months t-2 to t+1) to target company shareholders in domestic UK acquisitions using the 
following regression equation: CARi-2,+1 = α + β1Competitive + β2Revised + β3Outcome + β4Stake% + β5LogMV + β6Cash + β7Cash w/ln + β8Equity + β9Equity w/cash + µ.  Variables as defined 
in Table 4.  Cash w/ln alt refers to where there is a full loan note alternative to the cash offer, while equity w/cash alt refers to where there is a full cash alternative to the equity offer.  Due to 
the small sample sizes for some of the payment categories, coefficients for dummy variables have been estimated with four pay categories (the other pay categories have been combined, 
and are captured by the constant). VIF refers to the variance inflation factor.  a) Some of the cross-sectional variables were not available for all companies, thus reducing sample sizes.  b) 
While significant using OLS, the coefficient is not significant using robust (rank) regression.   
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Table 6 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of CAR-2,+1 
Cross-Border Effect 
      IM MM CAPM HGSC SD
      
Coef. 
p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value  VIF
Constant  0.3179 0.000   0.3568 0.000   0.3448 0.000   0.3256 0.000   0.2717 0.000  
Cross-border  0.0602 0.049 1.4  0.0917 0.005 1.5  0.0721 0.026 1.5  0.0816 0.010 1.5  0.0663 0.030 1.4 
Competitive  0.1278 0.002 1.1  0.0979 0.018 1.1  0.1094 0.008 1.1  0.0889 0.027 1.1  0.0965 0.020 1.1 
Revised  0.0646 0.038 1.1  0.0456c 0.138  1.1  0.0430c 0.160 1.1  0.0434 0.146 1.1  0.0627 0.047 1.1 
Outcome                -0.0526 0.073 1.1 -0.0292 0.319 1.1 -0.0311 0.288 1.1 -0.0365 0.200 1.1 -0.0476 0.105 1.1
Stake% -0.0005               0.430 1.1 -0.0007 0.287 1.1 -0.0004 0.543 1.1 -0.0003 0.678 1.1 -0.0006 0.310 1.1
Log MV                -0.0202 0.004 1.2 -0.0286 0.000 1.2 -0.0226 0.002 1.2 -0.0192 0.006 1.2 -0.0099 0.158 1.2
Cash only                -0.0264 0.425 1.8 -0.0576 0.102 1.8 -0.0705 0.044 1.8 -0.0789 0.021 1.8 -0.0384 0.248 1.8
Cash w/ln alt  0.0504c 0.135 1.6  0.0248 0.509 1.6  0.0426 0.255 1.6  0.0614 0.092 1.6  0.0889 0.009 1.6 
Equity only -0.1342               0.000 1.4 -0.0927 0.009 1.4 -0.1054 0.003 1.4 -0.1198 0.001 1.4 -0.1596 0.000 1.4
Equity w/cash alt  0.0203 0.493 1.5  0.0100 0.751 1.6  0.0137 0.662 1.6 -0.0085 0.780 1.6 -0.0331 0.264 1.5 
Observationsa    621      481      481      481      621   
Adjusted R2    8.4%      7.2%      7.0%      8.3%    10.2%   
F-value    6.68 0.000     4.72 0.000     4.61 0.000     5.36 0.000     8.06 0.000  
Park-test F-value    1.20 0.288     0.94 0.493     1.03 0.417     0.88 0.557     0.71 0.718  
Table contains regression output from cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (over months t-2 to t+1) to target company shareholders in both domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions into the UK using the following regression equation: CARi-2,+1 = CARi-2,+1 = α + β1Competitive +  β2Revised + β3Outcome + β4Stake% + β5LogMV + β6Cash + β7Cash w/ln 
+ β8Equity + β9Equity w/cash + π1-4Cross-Border + µ.  Variables as defined in Table 4.  The cross-border coefficient captures the incremental gain to target company shareholders in cross-
border as compared to domestic UK acquisitions (the target company cross-border effect).  Cash w/ln alt refers to where there is a full loan note alternative to the cash offer, while equity 
w/cash alt refers to where there is a full cash alternative to the equity offer.  Due to the small sample sizes for some of the payment categories, coefficients for dummy variables have been 
estimated with four pay categories (the other pay categories have been combined, and are captured by the constant). VIF refers to the variance inflation factor.  a) Some of the cross-sectional 
variables were not available for all companies, thus reducing sample sizes.  c) While not significant using OLS, the coefficient is significant using robust (rank) regression. 
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Table 7 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of CAR-2,+1 
Cross-Border Targets 
      IM MM CAPM HGSC SD
      
Coef. 
p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value VIF      Coef. p-value  VIF
Constant  0.3216 0.005   0.3811 0.001   0.2577 0.023   0.2653 0.019   0.3223 0.004  
Non-EU Europe -0.0872 0.162 1.4 -0.1016c 0.118          1.4 -0.0826 0.191 1.4 -0.0689 0.274 1.4 -0.0741 0.240 1.4
US -0.0093              0.890 1.5 -0.1138 0.093 1.5 -0.0699 0.287 1.5 -0.0632 0.334 1.5 -0.0115 0.865 1.5
Rest of World  0.0416 0.491 1.5 -0.0245 0.691 1.6  0.0297 0.621 1.6  0.0238 0.691 1.6  0.0327 0.595 1.5 
Exchange rate -0.0260 0.922 1.1  0.1172 0.667 1.2  0.1688 0.525 1.2 -0.0070 0.979 1.2 -0.0754 0.785 1.1 
Competitive  0.2244 0.035 1.2  0.2008b 0.077 1.3  0.1983 0.073 1.3  0.1543 0.161 1.3  0.1789 0.072 1.3 
Revised  0.0505              0.485 1.3 -0.0321 0.648 1.3 -0.0002 0.997 1.3 -0.0028 0.967 1.3  0.0416 0.573 1.2
Outcome               -0.0143 0.843 1.2 -0.0277 0.683 1.2 -0.0435 0.510 1.2 -0.0515 0.436 1.2 -0.0489 0.502 1.2
Stake% -0.0009              0.383 1.1 -0.0012 0.260 1.2 -0.0005 0.603 1.2 -0.0003 0.800 1.2 -0.0004 0.659 1.1
Log MV               -0.0327 0.051 1.4 -0.0236 0.139 1.4 -0.0186 0.227 1.4 -0.0094 0.539 1.4 -0.0320 0.056 1.3
Cash only  0.0951 0.275 4.0  0.0919 0.313 4.3  0.1333 0.134 4.3  0.0840 0.342 4.3  0.0684 0.424 3.7 
Cash w/ln alt  0.1751 0.039 3.6  0.1254 0.158 4.0  0.2179 0.013 4.0  0.1902 0.029 4.0  0.2083 0.014 3.5 
Equity only -0.0566              0.821 1.1 -0.1724 0.464 1.2 -0.0428 0.852 1.2 -0.1213 0.596 1.2 -0.0528 0.835 1.1
Observationsa    114       95       95       95      114   
Adjusted R2    7.3%      4.4%      5.1%      2.2%      7.2%   
F-value    1.74 0.069     1.36 0.203     1.42 0.172     1.17 0.315     1.74 0.070  
Park-test F-value    0.39 0.964     0.62 0.818     0.59 0.844     0.69 0.755     0.60 0.837  
Table contains regression output from cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (over months t-2 to t+1) to shareholders of UK companies receiving cross-border takeover bids 
using the following regression equation:  CARi-2,+1 = α + β1Competitive +  β2Revised + β3Outcome + β4Stake% + β5LogMV + β6Cash + β7Cash w/ln + β8Equity + β9Equity w/cash + π2b-1Non-EU 
European + π2b-2US + π2b-3Rest of World + π3Exchange Rate + µ.  Variables as defined in Table 4.  Non-EU Europe refers to bidders from European countries which are (or where at the time 
of the bid) not members of the EU, while Rest of the World refers to bidders based outside of Europe or the US.  (Cross-border bids by companies based in EU countries are captured by the 
constant term).  Cash w/ln alt refers to where there is a full loan note alternative to the cash offer, while equity w/cash alt refers to where there is a full cash alternative to the equity offer.  Due 
to the small sample sizes for some of the payment categories, coefficients for dummy variables have been estimated with three pay categories (there were no cross-border equity bids with 
cash alternative.  The other pay categories have been combined, and are captured by the constant).  VIF refers to the variance inflation factor.  a) Some of the cross-sectional variables were 
not available for all companies, thus reducing sample sizes. b) While significant using OLS, the coefficient is not significant using robust (rank) regression.  c) While not significant using OLS, 
the coefficient is significant using robust (rank) regression. 
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